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the number of months before the NBER date of the turn by which the
Committee was judged to have begun recognizing an approaching turn,
In three cases the pattern began more than three months before the
turn, but for only two (1953 and 1957) did it begin substantially before
that time. In each of these cases, the year previous to the peak year had
been a period in which the Committee exhibited considerable concern
about the possibility of a turn (see the above discussion of "false alarms").
As a rule of thumb, three months prior to a turn seems to be a reasonable
date for the beginning of recognition, and comparisons of the FOMC's





To give the reader more insight into, the forecasting ability of the
Committee than is provided by the certainty scores alone, this section
describes its recognition pattern for each of the seven postwar turns
covered in this study and compares its performance in recognizing and
confirming these with the performances of the forecasters in Fels' sample
of eight.
When policy actions are referred to, the author adopted the language
of the Committee in characterizing them. For example, the "policy of
neutrality" is the Committee's terminology, not the author's. Conse-
quently, the references to "easy," "tight," "neutral," etc., money policies
do not necessarily represent the author's opinion as to what monetary
policy was being pursued, but represent the Committee's intentions as
indicated in its minutes. Such references are merely descriptive and, as
noted above, the scoring of the FOMC's forecasts is independent of the
actions taken.Recognition Pattern. Chronological Review 73
1. The 1948 Peak
With the expiration of wartime price controls in the second half of 1946,
an inflation began that dominated the economy from 1946 to late 1948.
Throughout 1947 and 1948 monetary policy was designed to keep
pressure on member bank reserves and to restrain the further expansion
of bank credit. However, because of the wartime growth of the public
debt and because of its responsibility for maintaining an orderly market
for government securities at low interest rates, the Federal Reserve was
unable to restrain credit expansion to the desired extent and acted as a
"permissive parent" of the inflation.
Inflationary pressures paused twice over the three-year period of ex-
pansion: once in the second quarter of 1947 when businesses began dis-
investing in inventories, and again in early 1948 when commodity prices
broke sharply downward. The Committee indicated little concern that
the first lull in the pace of inflation might be the beginning or forewarn-
ing of recession. It viewed the pause as temporary relief from persistent
inflationary pressures.22 In contrast, Fels found that the lull "was widely
misinterpreted as the beginning of recession" by many analysts.23 During
the second pause, the Committee took a "wait and see" attitude as to
whether the decline in commodity prices was the signal of a major ad-
justment or simply a needed correction of a particular situation. The
consensus was that, despite the price break, the basic inflationary forces
were still at work.24 Again some business commentators "raised the
question of recession prematurely." 25
The downturn began in the fourth quarter of 1948. The NBER's
business cycle peak is November. At its October meeting, the Committee
appraised the situation as inflationary and recommended a continuing
anti-inflationary program.26 Their comments show that the Committee
members had little premonition that a cyclical peak was imminent.
During November the FOMC recognized a hesitation in business ac-
22 Minutes, June 5, 1947, pp. 102ff.
23Part I of this volume, p. 26.
24Minutes, February 26 and 27, 1948, pp. 24—49.
25 Part I, p. 26.
26 Minutes, October 4, 1948, pp. 165—72. John H. Williams, a staff member,
expressed the very perceptive opinion,as summarized inthe minutes, that
"inflation was in the process of wearing itseLf out, that the prospect was for
moving sidewise or even downward, that a serious downturn was unlikely."
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tivity but viewed the weakness as temporary and felt that the basic
expansionary forces continued unchanged.27 Over the next three months,
there was a gradual drift toward pessimism about the future direction
of the economy. By March 1949, the Committee regarded the economic
situation as a "healthy readjustment" which would be helpful in bringing
greater stability to the economy. Its feeling was that a moderate adjust-
ment could prevent a precipitous downward spiral in the future.It
wished to encourage what was viewed as a helpful development, and
changed from a policy of restraint to one of "neutrality." 28 The Com-
mittee felt "it should replace the existing policy of exercising restraint
on credit expansion with a policy which would relax such restraint
without following an aggressive easy money policy." 29
During April and May the FOMC continued to adjust policy in the
direction of ease as it became increasingly confident that the "healthy
readjustment" was turning into cyclical recession. But it was not until
June that the Committee confirmed that the economy was actually in
the midst of a recession. They agreed that "declines in business in recent
months had gone faster than had been considered likely at the beginning
of the year, [and] that further declines appeared probable.. .. Now
the time has come for an affirmative credit policy in the light of the
developing business situation, which would have significance to the
market, the banking system, and ourselves." 30
Relative to the NBER business cycle peak date of November, 1948,
this means that the lag in confirming the occurrence of the downturn
was some seven months—the Committee's poorest performance during
the period studied. The recognition patterns of the FOMC and other
business analysts were quite similar (Chart 11-1). For the Committee,
the scores for this peak were the lowest for any of the seven turns;
for the business analysts, scores for recognition were lower than for any
other turn except 1960. The business forecasters did not "recognize"
(i.e., did not receive a score greater than 50) until two months after
the NBER date of the peak; the Committee received such a score only
three months afterwards. Neither group had "confirmed" (i.e., received
a score of 90 or better) by the end of six months. For the Committee
this was the only turn that was not confirmed within a six-month period.
27Minutes, November 15, 1948, pp.180—183.
28Ibid., March 1,1949, pp. 44—50.
29 Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1949, p. 111.
















Part I of this study and other original data made available to the
Although the recognition performance of the "best" forecasting publica-
tion was inferior to that of the average of the eight in the immediate
vicinity of the peak, it is interesting to note that it confirmed the occur-
rence of the turn in March—the month of policy change by the Com-
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What accounts for the relatively poor performances in recognizing the
cyclical changes taking place in 1948? Fels hypothesized that forecasters
(1) did not realize the extent to which the structure of the economic
system had changed as a result of the depression and the war, (2) became
cautious after misinterpreting the lull in 1947 as the beginning of reces-
sion and repeated the error in early 1948, (3) wondered if the decline
might be followed by another bout of inflation, and (4) thought in terms
of deep depression and rapid inflation rather than business cycles with
mild contractions
Mostof these factors influenced the Committee. The recession that
occurred was not the expected depression. Although the widely held
expectation of a severe contraction following the war proved groundless,
the FOMC felt that continued inflation would only make the ultimate
adjustments more severe. Twice before, the economy had halted its
inflationary expansion, and these postponements of the contraction could
only make the inevitable downswing deeper. The decline that did occur
was so mild relative to expectations that it was considered a "healthy
readjustment" which would reduce the inevitable reaction following
three years of almost continuous inflation. The Committee was aware
that government expenditures were to increase sharply. This, in com-
bination with the tax cut in the spring of 1948 and the newly adopted
role of the government in attempting to stabilize economic activity, led
to expectations of continued expansion over the near term.
In addition, however, the FOMC was particularly concerned about
inflation because of its inability to restrict credit to the desired extent.
Its responsibility for pegging interest rates on government securities left
the Committee with little room to maneuver against inflationary pressures
and made its members acutely aware of their inability to restrain credit
expansion. They were increasingly conscious of inflationary develop-
ments after experiencing almost three years of frustration in trying to
slow down the expansion of credit. The Committee's concern with the
problem of halting inflation led it to neglect the developing recession.
2. The 1949 Trough
The eleven-month contraction was very mild. In constant (1958) dol-
lars, GNP declined from a peak of $328.7 billion in the fourth quarter
See PartIof this volume.Recognition Pattern. Chronological Review 77
of 1948 to a low of $323.3 billion in the fourth quarter of 1949. The
trough was double-bottomed. A recovery began in July only to be
interrupted by the coal and steel strikes in September and early October,
but the lull was short and expansion resumed when the strikes ended.
The second trough in October is the one selected by the NBER as the
business cycle date.
At its August meeting, the Committee agree.d that "as long as the
condition of declining economic activity continued the System should
see to it that conditions of monetary ease and low money rates were
maintained as a means of encouraging business activity." 32 In Septem-
ber the Committee "recognized" the cyclical turn and a score of 60
was assigned to the forecasts. It felt that the expansion of business ac-
tivity during July and August probably indicated that the end of reces-
sion was near but decided that nascent recovery was too precarious to
warrant a change in the direction of policy. Indicative comments were:
If the signs of developing business recovery which were apparent during
July and August had begun to accelerate and give indication of an end
of the present period of adjustment, there might be some reason for re-
examining the policies adopted by the System in June, but...ithad
become clear that the recovery was rather precarious and ...anadjust-
ment still had to take place in the price structure.33
In view of the recent and continuing recovery in business activity, the
present did not seem ...tobe an appropriate time to make the reduction
in discount rates.34
The Executive Committee of the FOMC "confirmed" the revival in
business conditions at their November meeting and advocated a shift
in policy toward restraint. Allan Sproul stated that "it appeared to be
the consensus of the System economists that present business conditions
would continue at about existing high levels through the first half of
1950, ..andthe high levels of business activity were re-introducing
an inflationary bias in the economy.. .."MarrinerEccles' opinion
was that "the System should give some indication through a firming of
short-term rates that it had recognized the change in conditions that had
taken place in recent months."The Committee agreed that continued
32 Minutes, August 5, 1949, pp. 11.2—113.
Ibid., September 21, 1949, p. 145.
Ibid., p.156.
Ibid., pp. 156—157.78 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
expansion was expected and that a more restrictive credit policy should
be followed.
Of all turns, the average certainty score for the 1949 trough is the
highest. If the NBER business cycle date is used as the criterion, the
Committee "confirmed" the reversal only one month after it occurred
and "recognized" the turn one month before it occurred. However, it is
clear that the Committee felt that the cyclical turn occurred in July.
The coal and steel strike which interrupted the revival in October was
not viewed as a sufficient force to break the economy's continued up-
ward movement. If the alternative date of the trough (July) is used,
then the confirmation lag is four months and the recognition lag two
months. In either case, the FOMC was much more prompt in correctly
assessing the situation than were the business analysts (see Chart 11-2).
Fels found that "among troughs, the scores for 1949 are lowest, though
the difference from 1958 is slight. The scores might have been even
lower for 1949 had the trough not been double-bottomed."Indeed,
it was not until April 1950, that the business analysts reached an aver-
age score of 90 per cent (i.e., "confirmed" the occurrence of the trough),
some five months after the FOMC. Although the "best" forecasting
publication did significantly better than the average of the eight, it did
not match the FOMC in confirming the turn. In light of the per-
formance of others for recognizing and confirming the 1949 trough, the
Committee's performance was remarkable. The discounting of the de-
flationary impact of the strikes undoubtedly accounts for most of the
superiority of the FOMC over the other forecasters.
3. The 1953 Peak
Following the 1949 trough, the economy began an expansion, dom-
inated by developments associated with the Korean war, which carried
GNP to a record level of $367.5 billion in the second quarter of 1953.
During all of 1950 and through the first half of 1951 the Federal Re-
serve continued and intensified its policy of credit restraint. However, as
1951 progressed, the inflationary pressures slackened and the outlook
became one of approximate balance at a high level of activity. Begin-
ning in June, the Committee changed to a policy of "neutrality."
As the economy continued expanding through 1952 and into 1953,













Certainty Scores for the October 1949 Trough
0
-3 —2-l 0 +1 +2 +3 ÷4
Months before C—) or Qfter (+) business cycle trough
NDI
SOURCE: Part I of this study and other original data made available to the
author.
and its need for money and credit grew with increasing activity, the
policy of neutrality gradually became a policy of restraint. A gradual
shift in the viewpoint of the Committee occurred during the first quarter
of 1953: there was a growing concern that the expansion might develop
into an unsustainable boom which would eventually result in downward
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adjustments. The Committee unanimously agreed that open market
operations should be conducted so as not to encourage ease.38
Pessimism about the future course of business activity increased dur-
ing April and May; there was a change of emphasis in open market
operations, from a policy designed "not to encourage ease" to one in-
tending "to keep the market tight but to keep it from getting any
tighter."The comment which typified the Committee's view was that:
The Open Market Committee's policy of credit neutrality gradually be-
came a policy of credit restraint and, with a further lag, has become a tight
money policy
The necessitous borrowing of the Treasury will press further on bank
reserves, and put further pressure on the money market if we do nothing
to offset it. It would be appropriate to buy government securities to prevent
this Treasury borrowing from introducing new pressures upon bank re-
serves.40
The Committee decided that, in light of the existing tightness and the
needs of the Treasury, some reserves should be injected into the market
in order to keep it from becoming too tight.4'
At its June meeting, the FOMC agreed that there should be a further
increase in in the near future. The Committee injected reserves
into the market primarily because of the existing tightness and the an-
ticipated disorderly market in government securities, and only secondar-
ily because of some concern about the near-term condition of business
activity.
At the June meeting the Committee's staff review stated that eco-
nomic conditions were "characterized by a moderately higher level of
economic activity and generally stable prices. While the economic situa-
tion has continued strong, financial markets have been unsettled at
times and throughout the period there has been an undertone of concern
about potential declines in economic activity." 42 After an extended
discussion of "disorderly markets," the Committee members agreed that
reserves should be injected into the market on a sharply rising basis in
order to keep the situation from getting tighter.43 Although their discus-
38Minutes, March 24, 1953, p. 106.
May 26, 1953, p. 191.
May 6, 1953, p. 147.
41 Ibid., pp. 147—158.
42 IbidJune 11, 1953, pp. 199—200.
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sion indicates that they were aware of the changing business conditions,
they did not view the situation as the beginning of cyclical contraction.
We assigned a certainty score of 45.
During July and August, after the Treasury financing program was
out of the way, the FOMC decided that only token purchases should
be made for the System's account. This is further evidence that the pos-
sibility of a peak was only a marginal factor in the decision to in-
ject reserves during June. The staff review in August typifies the view-
point of the Committee concerning the future outlook:
Record levels of aggregate output and employment attained in the second
quarter of 1953 have generally been maintained thus far in the current
quarter;...thesituation continued to be characterized by over-all sta-
bility in prices and activity and by considerable selectivity in developments
in particular lines; and ...whetherthis is a period of formation of forces
for further uptrend or for some downward readjustment can not yet be
clearly read from current business indicators.44
The Committee members viewed the near-term outlook as one of con-
tinued horizontal movement at high levels and they were trying to keep
the balance between inflationary and deflationary developments. In light
of their discussion, we assigned a score of 50 to the August meeting.
At the September meeting, a policy of active ease was begun. The
Committee was not yet convinced that recession was underway but con-
sidered the probability of renewed inflation to be small. From a balance
between inflationary and deflationary forces, the Committee's outlook
changed to a balance between stability and deflationary forces. Al-
though the initiation of such a policy makes it apparent that the Com-
mittee recognized the probability of deflationary forces gaining the upper
hand (the certainty score was 70), it was not until January 1954 that
the July peak was actually confirmed as the beginning of a recession in
business activity.
Among the four peaks, the FOMC's performance in recognizing the
1953 turn was the best. The same is true for the business analysts and
for the "best" forecaster of the eight.45 Although the recognition patterns
of the average of the forecasters and the Committee were quite similar,
the "best" forecaster did significantly better (see Chart 11-3). Several
months before the peak both groups evidenced concern about the level
August 25, 1953, p. 318.
45PartI, p. 28, and other original data made available to the author.82 Recognition
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of activity during the second half of In anticipating changing
business conditions, the Committee did well. However, as the peak ap-
proached and passed, definite realization that recession was, in fact,
occurring increased only slowly, as Chart 11-3 indicates. Several reasons
could account for such a pattern of recognition.
The downswing was relatively easy to anticipate. The end of the
Korean war was not difficult to foresee and the reduction in defense
expenditures was anticipated. Such expenditures had been a mainstay
through most of the expansion. This time there were no accumulated
private demands as a result of war shortages and no accumulated liquid
assets to fill the gap. Indeed, in several areas (i.e., consumer durables,
plant and equipment, and housing) private demands had been stable or
declining since early 1951. Consequently no good reason existed to ex-
pect continued expansion once defense expenditures were cut.
In addition, the FOMC had already taken action to ease pressure in
the money market before the peak occurred. In June, a month before the
NBER business cycle peak, the Committee injected substantial amounts
of reserves into the market to avoid further tightening. The members
realized that their policy of neutrality had gradually become a policy of
restraint and then of undue tightness as the economy continued to ex-
pand. The fear of failure of the Treasury debt issue and the uncer-
tainty of the business outlook led them to ease credit conditions. Con-
sequently, since action had already been taken, the Committee was
under no real pressure to confirm the "slippage" in economic activity as
nascent recession and to reverse the direction of policy. In addition, the
recession was so mild that euphemisms such as "horizontal movement at
a high level," and "slippage" were not unfounded.
Whatever the reasons for the slow confirmation, the Committee must
be given credit for a good early warning of the peak. The FOMC took
appropriate action, however gratuitous, prior to the turn in business ac-
tivity and probably modified the severity of the subsequent recession.
46Twomembers of the Committee made excellent forecasts as early as the
fall of 1952. In October, C. R. Youngdahl, a staff member, described the out-
look as "one in which we are looking toward a period of downward adjustment
next spring or after mid-1953, while rather strong business activity is indicated
for the period immediately ahead." (Minutes, October 22, 1952, p. 194.) And in
November, C. S. Young said: "While a good level of business activity was antici-
pated through the first quarter of 1953.. .therewas considerable sentiment
that some decline would occur after that, partly because it was anticipated that
defense expenditures would decline." (Ibid., November 5, 1952, p. 202.)84 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
4. The 1954 Trough
The contraction lasted thirteen months—from July 1953 until August
1954. During the first half of 1954, consumer expenditures became an
expansionary force. One of the primary factors supporting the rise in
consumption was the increase in disposable income as a result of the
January 1954 tax cut. The revival of consumer expenditures, the con-
tinued expansion of state and local government spending, and the
stability of fixed investment soon brought the contraction to a halt and
the economy moved sidewise through most of the second and third
quarteis of 1954. The recovery began in September.
As the recession continued into 1954 with little evidence of either an
upswing or a leveling off, the Committee continued its policy of active
ease through the first quarter of 1954. In April there was a slight drift
toward optimism as the recession seemed to be slowing down, and by
May the consensus was that the economy was beginning to level off.
Indicative comments were:
Unless the downward drift was reinforced by fresh contractive factors,
activity might be approaching a balanced position at current moderately re-
duced levels. While the foundations of revival might be taking shape, the
sources of revival impetus were not yet clear.47
The decline had begun to level off but whether it is a U or V bottom,
or just a ledge in a downward drift, we can not yet know.48
The current decline in economic activity had about leveled off...
InJune it was apparent that the rate of decline in activity had slowed
and the "leveling off" thesis was maintained by the Committee with little
increase in confidence as to the future outlook. The active ease policy
was continued through the entire second quarter.
The outlook had improved somewhat by the beginning of the third
quarter and the Committee was assigned a score of 50 (see Chart 11-4).
The drift toward optimism began in July. The typical view was ex-
pressed by staff member Frank R. Garfield when he said, as sum-
marized in the minutes, "during June economic developments continued
to show mixed trends with further indications that recessionary tenden-
cies were abating but no clear evidence that an upturn was under
4TMinutes, May 11, 1954, pp. 147—148.
48 Ibid., p. 150.
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way." 50DuringAugust, the NBER trough date, the Committee stuck to
its view that the economy was leveling off but saw some signs of im-
provement. Thecommon view was that "the economy appears to be
moving sidewise with some signs of improvement. ...Thereis nothing
50Ibid.,July 7, 1954, pp. 208—209.
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at present, however, to indicate a strong upsurge and modest seasonal
increases this fall is the most likely outcome." 51Againthere was no
change in the policy of active ease.
Although in September the economy started its upswing from the
plateau on which it had been for the past several months, the Com-
mittee's view was much the same as before. Allan Sproul stated the
typical view:
We appear to have been on an economic plateau for the past three or
four months following upon the decline in economic activity which began
in the summer of 1953.
I believe that a generally sidewise movement of the economy is more
likely during the next few months than a pronounced and cumulative move-
ment either up or down.52
The Committee members agreed that continued sidewise movement was
the most likely prospect over the near term and decided to continue
the existing policy of ease.
The Committee's outlook changed little by the October meetings. It
agreed with R. A. Young's characterization of the situation as one of
"high level doldrums." There were too few encouraging signs to indicate
general revival and few signs of renewed recession. But increasing op-
timism concerning future economic activity was indicated at the Novem-
ber meeting, along with some concern about nascent -speculation, and
the certainty score increased to 80 (see Chart 11-4). The Committee rec-
ognized the strengthening in the situation and doubted that the upward
trend would be reversed. However, the members were not entirely con-
vinced that cyclical expansion was already underway and did not change
the policy of active ease.
At its December meetings, the Committee was virtually certain that
a cyclical turn in business conditions had occurred and that revival was
underway. Most of the Committee expressed agreement with Allan
Sproul's assessment of the outlook:
The economy seems definitely to have turned upward... Thedanger
in continuing to pursue the first course [aggressive easel is that it might
now encourage speculative forces in the economy which could lead to a
brief burst of activity and another relapse.
We are just coming into a recovery phase of economic activity, in which
51Ibid.,August 24, 1954, p. 245.
Ibid., September 22, 1954, pp. 277—278.Recognition Pattern. Chronological Review 87
we want to avoid a false speculative upturn, but in which we also want
to avoid nipping the bud of real recovery.53
R. A. Young pointed out that "data becoming available made it clear
that a vigorous economic recovery was now visible and tangible."
And Chairman Martin thought that "recovery had a full head of steam."
He doubted if the Federal Reserve was likely to do anything which could
"nip the recovery in the bud."
For the 1954 trough, the FOMC's certainty scores were the second
highest of any turn—second only to scores in the vicinity of the 1949
trough. For the business analysts and the "best" of the eight, the cer-
tainty scores for this turn were the highest among any of the postwar
turns.56 Although both groups confirmed the occurrence of the trough
in December, the business forecasters were substantially more optimistic
through the second and third quarters when the Committee characterized
the economy as moving sidewise. The performance of the "best" analyst
is so good that it suggests an "optimistic" bias. For a comparison of
these three performances see Chart 11-4.
Flat or U-shaped turns in the direction of economic activity are in-
herently more difficult to recognize than sharp or V-shaped turns. The
1954 trough was flat bottomed which makes precise dating of the turn
difficult and somewhat tenuous. If the present National Bureau business
cycle date of August is taken as the date of the trough, the recognition
performance of all forecasters studied is quite good. If recent revisions in
data influence the NBIER to move the trough to a period earlier in the
year, perhaps May, June, or July, the performances will not look as
good.57
As Chart 11-4 shows, the certainty scores of the Committee are sub-
stantially below those of other forecasters for the months in the immedi-
ate vicinity of the trough. Perhaps this is a case where policy responsi-
bility dampened the FOMC's optimism. As early as April, the Corn-
December 7, 1954, pp.366—368.
Ibid., December 28, 1954, pp. 395—396.
p. 403.
56SeePart I, p. 29, and other original data made available to the author.
For discussion of the NBER and alternative dates of cyclical turns, see:
Lorman C. Trueblood, "The Dating of Postwar Business Cycles," Proceedings
of the Business and Economics Section of the American Statistical Association,
Washington, D. C.,1961; George W. Cloos, "How Good Are the National
Bureau's Reference Cycle Dates?" Journal of Business, January 1963; and Victor
Zarnowitz, "On the Dating of Business Cycles," Journal of Business, April 1963.88 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
mittee was aware of the slackening in the pace of recessionary tenden-
cies and correctly diagnosed the "leveling off" which occurred. However,
there was not a significant increase in its certainty score until November,
and cyclical expansion was not confirmed until December. It is ap-
parent that the FOMC was wary of nipping possible recovery in the bud
and this concern influenced its views during the extended period of side-
wise movement.
5. The 1957 Peak
The recovery gained vigor in the early part of 1955 and the expansion
proved to be one of the most exuberant on record. From the trough
in GNP during the second quarter of 1954, the economy grew over the
next thirty-five months to a peak GNP of $446.3 billion during the
third quarter of 1957—an increase of over 20 per cent. The economy
teetered on the brink of contraction throughout 1956. However, the
boom in fixed investment by business and the revival of government
expenditures helped to prevent cyclical contraction. The expansion re-
sumed in the fourth quarter of 1956, sparked by the recovery from the
steel strike, the increase in automobile production resulting from the
introduction of new models, an increase in federal government expendi-
tures, and a sharp increase in exports as a result of the Suez Crisis.
However, the economy was unable to maintain the momentum, and the
peak of the expansion came in July 1957 (with August a close runner-
up).
Upon recognizing the revival in economic activity, the FOMC began
tightening credit and continued to put pressure on the reserve position
of member banks throughout 1955. Even though the Committee fluctu-
ated between optimism and pessimism as to the rate of economic activity
during 1956, at no time did it foresee a probability of deflationary
forces gaining sufficient strength to carry the economy into recession.
At the beginning of 1957, the Committee characterized the economic
situation as strong and still inflationary. The economy continued to oper-
ate at close to peak levels but seemed to be losing some of its momentum.
During February there was increasing discussion of the possibility of a
downturn sometime during the year, but the Committee felt that the
evidence of weaknesses was not yet sufficient to justify a change in theRecognition Pattern: Chronological Review 89
policy of restraint. Its view was that the economy might be entering a
period of sidewise movement at high levels.
No change in policy was made at the March or April meetings al-
though the Committee noted that evidence of slackening continued to
mount. The economic situation was pictured as one of activity on a
"high plateau." The tenor of reports at the May meetings was little
changed. The outlook continued uncertain; some economic indicators
were edging up while others were drifting down. The Committee de-
cided that the prudent course of action was to maintain the status quo
and to wait until the outlook was clear before taking any policy action.
In its midyear outlook, the Committee judged that the economy con-
tinued to operate at high levels although moving sidewise, perhaps with
a slight upward tilt. The majority of the FOMC felt that the most prob-
able direction of activity was an upturn in the fall, with a concomi-
tant increase in inflationary pressures. The Committee's August forecast
was essentially the same. Although the discount rate was raised from
3 to 3.5 per cent between the July and August meetings, no change
was made in open market policy or in the degree of restraint to be main-
tained in either month. The minutes summarized Chairman Martin's
statement of the consensus as follows:
With the seasonal demand coming on he would tend toward a $500—$400
million level of net borrowed reserves rather than risk getting up to $600
million or higher.... Thediscussion today made it clear in his opinion
that there should be no change in the Committee's directive and no change
in policy, and he subscribed to that point of view completely.58
The certainty score for August (40) reflects the view that the Com-
mittee did not think a peak probable and its discussion of policy in-
dicated no desire to change the degree of restraint.
The FOMC detected little change in the trend of economic activity
at its September meeting. Its view was that activity continued at high
levels with offsetting adjustments. The members foresaw neither the
formation of deflationary forces sufficient to cause a downturn nor a
combination of forces which would lead to an upsurge of general de-
mand pressures and greater inflationary pressures. Its minutes indicate
that the Committee did not visualize a change in policy from continued
restraint and that it had not "recognized" the peak. However, several
58 Minutes, August 20, 1957, pp. 530—531.90 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
members indicated that, because of the increased pessimism in the
business and financial communities, the same degree of tightness could
be achieved with a lower level of negative free reserves.59 Chairman
Martin's position, as summarized in the minutes, was that:
it was always necessary to resolve doubt one way or the other in carrying
out Committee policy, and for the immediate future [until the current
Treasury financing was completed] he would resolve these doubts on the
side of ease rather than tightness.6°
In October, there was a decided increase in pessimism. The staff
stated that recent developments called for a thorough review of the
economic situation, and that:
the economy as a whole showed basic strength but there was uncertainty
as to what combination of demands would prevent recession in activity or,
better, make for advance in total output and employment at .present price
levels.01
Other representative comments were:
Doubts as to the business outlook have been very considerably strength-
ened by developments since we met three weeks ago.
Statistical data for September and early October suggest that the business
plateau which we have recognized for many months is beginning to tilt
downward.62
Now that the marked upturn in fall business activity has not materialized,
the time has come for adapting Federal Reserve System credit policy to an
economic situation which indicates that general activity may be falling from
its long heralded high plateau.63
However, not all members of the Committee shared the more pes-
simistic outlook. As Vice-Chairman Hayes summed it up:
There was a fairly even division between those who appraised the outlook
with the view that statistics and developments that had been observed held
a considerable threat of recession and those who felt that basically such a
possibility was still to be demonstrated and that recent developments were
largely psychological with the basic factors remaining strong.64
Ibid., September 10, 1957, pp. 547—557.
60 Ibid., pp. 570—572.
61 Ibid., October 22,1957,pp. 615—618.
62 Ibid., pp. 619—622.
63 Ibid., pp. 630—631.
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These divergent views resulted in a decision to make no overt change
in policy direction. The Committee's decision was that:
there was no immediate occasion to reverse its policy of restraint on credit
expansion or to make a change in the policy directive. While it was clear
that the Committee at this juncture did not wish to make any move which
would signal a change in policy, it wished to supply seasonal needs reason-
ably freely. It did wish to increase restraint from what it had been. There
was some feeling that the Committee should actually diminish restraint a
little, but more of the members believed that the Committee should resolve
doubts on the side of ease.65
At the November meeting, although all the members recognized that
the economy was no longer on the "high plateau," not all of them
were willing to call the downward trend the begirming of a cyclical
contraction. Comments indicative of the two views were:
The most recently available data confirm that moderate downward ad-
justment has, in fact, been occurring. Indeed, the composite showing that
cyclical downturn has now set in is fairly impressive.66
These changes had been desirable and in the direction that the Committee
had been aiming for some time past in trying to bring the inflationary
forces under control. There was still a strong possibility of a resurgence of
upward pressures...andany overt move toward ease, any positive change
in the direction of policy, would seem...tobe a mistake at this time.67
There was no longer a question of forecasting a change in the economy;
it was a question of recognizing what was on us.68
The policy consensus reached by the Committee was to moderate
the pressure on bank reserves. It changed its directive for the first time
since March 1957, and instructed the account manager to conduct
operations with a view to "fostering sustainable growth in the economy
without inflation, by moderatin.g the pressures on bank reserves." 69
The Minutes clearly indicate that this was the first overt action taken
in the direction of ease as a result of anticipated economic trends.
Prior to this action, policy changes had been slight modifications within
the continuing policy of restraint. In November the policy of restraint
itself was abandoned. Such a decisive change was in keeping with the
65 Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1957, p. 54.
66 Minutes, November 12, 1957, pp. 660—662.
67 Ibid., pp. 690—691.
68 Ibid., pp. 67 1—674.
69 Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1957, pp. 54—55.92 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
rise in the certainty score from 55 to 85. The minor adjustments in
policy made in the previous three months reflect the FOMC's response
to a slowly changing assessment of the outlook.
Despite the policy change that occurred in November, it was not
until the December meetings that the Committee was definitely con-
vinced that a cyclical downturn had occurred and that the economy
was in a recession. R. A. Young's statement typifies the Committee's
outlook:
In recent reports to the Committee, I have used the words "downsettling"
to characterize the drift in over-all activity. In the light of recent information,
general economic recession now appears to be the most appropriate de-
scription.T0
Thus it was some five months after the July peak before the FOMC
"confirmed" the contraction as a cyclical one.
Among peaks, the FOMC's certainty scores for 1957 are second only
to those for 1953. The same is true for the business analysts. The
recognition patterns of the two groups are strikingly similar, although
the Committee was somewhat more pessimistic during the period of
sidewise movement. Both groups indicated significant increases in the
degree of recognition in November, after the President's comment that
the economy was taking a breather. To account for the business fore-
casters' poorer performance in recognizing the 1957 peak relative to the
1953 peak, Fels suggested that "inaccurate information" and the "per-
sistence of inflation, in the form of rising consumer prices, after the
cyclical peak was'passed" were contributing f actors.7' These influenced
the forecasts of the Committee as well, particularly the continued rise
in the consumer price index. (See Chart 11-5.)
Both the Committee and the average of the business analysts per-
formed better than the "best" business forecaster. lEn this case, the latter's
"optimistic bias" worked against it. Even four months after the peak,
the publication did not view a recession as probable.
6. The 1958 Trough
The cyclical peak occurred during the third quarter of 1957. The re-
cession that followed was the shortest but the most severe of the postwar
7°Minutes,December 12, 1957, p. 770.
71See Part I, pp. 30—31.Months before (—) or after business cycle peak
SOURCE: Part I of this study and other original
author.
data made available to the
period. Indeed, it was one of the shortest on record, lasting only nine
months—from July 1957to April 1958. Though brief, the contraction
was sharp. GNP declined from $446.3 in 1957-Ill to $434.7 in 1958-I.
Despite the decline in business activity, price levels generally continued
rising during the contraction, so that in real terms the recessionwas
Recognition Pattern: Chronological Review 93
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even more severe. Unemployment rose from 3 per cent of the labor force
at the peak of the expansion to a postwar high of 7.4 per cent a year
later. The upturn came quickly. Early in 1958, the deflationary factors
abated in strength and expansionary factors gained in force. According
to the NBER chronology the trough occurred in April.
The Committee continued to ease credit during the first quarter of
1958. It had recognized the recession and was concerned about its
length and depth. Virtually all economic indicators were continuing
their downward trend and the outlook was for further contraction in
activity. The comment characterizing the view of the majority in early
March was that:
the most recent facts clearly suggest that the 1957—58 recession has a
better than even chance of being less moderate in extent and duration than
either the 1948—49 recession or the 1953—54recession.T2
In mid-April, the outlook was for continued decline in output and
employment, but the Committee did see faint signs of some slowing down
in the rate of decline and perhaps even some leveling off. The majority
of the Committee felt that:
most recent data on recession are suggestive of some slowing down in the
pace of decline for total output and employment, some leveling out in
trade, and some developments of an expansive character in finance.
At the same time, the over-all drift isstill plainly downward. Indeed,
current figures offer only slight basis for hope that the saucering-out phase
of recession is at hand, and very little, if any encouragement for hope that
revival will be setting in within a score of
A few members were substantially more optimistic than this statement
indicates. For example, Governor Robertson stated that "he had a very
definite feeling that the economy was getting ready to start upward."
To ease the market, the Committee, on balance, favored a reduction of
the discount rate and a reduction in reserve requirements in lieu of open
market purchases. These actions were taken.
The Committee became more optimistic during its meetings in May.
The talk of a leveling-off and a recovery increased. Many of the economic
indicators suggested that the recession might be "saucering out" but
72 Minutes, March 4, 1958, pp. 170—173.
April 15, 1958, pp. 269—270.
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there was no clear evidence of a general upswing. The majority opinion
was that:
a bottom to decline in economic activity appears to be in the making.
But it is a long jump from the conclusion that recession may be bottom-
ing out to the conclusion that recovery is shortly to begin.
On balance, it seems best to view the period which the economy is now
entering as one of test of recession bottom.75
Governor Robertson again differed with the view of the majority. He
advocated a policy formulated on the basis of a recovery rather than a
leveling-off.76 The Committee decided that there was no need for a
change in policy or in the degree of ease.
By June the Committee was convinced that the recession was bot-
toming-out, but was undecided as to the length of the bottom and the
timing of the recovery. The comment most representative of the FOMC's
view was that:
Bottoming-out of recession isi.nfact occurring. Itis the better part of
wisdom not to conclude as yet that a recovery pattern has definitely taken
form
GovernorRobertson persisted in his optimism. To him "The economic
report indicated very clearly a leveling out or possibly an upward move-
ment." 78 Again the Committee made no change in the existing degree of
ease to be maintained. Although there was no change in policy, their
discussion of the outlook indicates that the Committee members thought
the probability of cyclical recovery in June to be about 50-50 (see
Chart 11-6).
AsJuly progressed, the Committee shifted its views of the situation
from leveling-off to doubts about the nature of the recovery: temporary
or permanent. Comments indicative of the doubtful nature of the re-
bound were:
Whether an abrupt turnabout of activityistaking place or whether
evident improvement merely reflects a temporary rebound of production
too far below consumption is yet to be determined.7D
Ibid., May 27, 1958, pp. 377—379.
76Ibid., p. 298. "Ibid.,June17, 1958, pp. 429—430.
78 Ibid., p. 434.
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The country was not yet in a vigorous recovery and there was still a pos-
sibility that the economy might be experiencing sort of a false bottom.8°
By its last meeting in July, the evidence of business improvement was
sufficient to cause the FOMC to change the direction of policy, although
80 Ibid., p. 501.
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it was not completely confident that a cyclical upswing had indeed oc-
curred and that the recovery was more than temporary. All the mem-
bers' comments were hedged with such phrases as "looks as if," "in-
creasingly clear," and "no conclusive evidence." For example, Young, in
his staff review, pinpointed the turning point date but hedged just a bit:
"domestically, springback of economic activity has been impressive, so
much so that it now looks as if April will mark the recession trough
and May the first month of revival."Most of the other statements by
Committee members were hedged with qualifications. In view of the
evident improvement in business conditions, the Committee decided
that the appropriate policy was to reduce the existing degree of ease
by recapturing redundant reserves which had been injected into the
market in early July to combat a "disorderly condition."
It was not until August that the Committee confirmed that the con-
traction was over and decided to move decisively in the direction of
tightness. Only then was the policy directive changed to provide for
open market operations with a view "to fostering conditions in the money
market conducive to balanced economic recovery." 82 The Committee
agreed that cyclical revival was underway and concurred with R. A.
Young's statement that:
we no longer need to be tentative about the fact of domestic economic
recovery. The unfolding data are abundantly clear. They show vigorous
revival—one of the more robust on record following one of history's shorter
and milder contraction periods.83
Among troughs, the Committee's certainty scores in the vicinity of
the 1958 turn were the lowest. The same is true for the average score
of the eight business analysts. Although the Committee recognized a
change in the situation as early as April, and perceived the recovery
in early July, it was not until August that it was confident that the re-
cession was over. After experiencing two recessions which had rather
flat bottoms, undoubtedly the Committee members were again expecting
a "saucering out" rather than a sharp turn upward. Such an expectation
would account for their reluctance to confirm that the recovery recog-
nized in July was the cyclical trough.
Much the same pattern of recognition was followed by other fore-
July 29, 1958, p. 590.
82 Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1958, p. 59.
83 Minutes, August 19, 1958, p. 692.98 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
casters (see Chart 11-6). Again the performance of the "best" forecaster
was remarkable, especially in comparison with the FOMC and the
average of the eight analysts. One again suspects a strong optimistic
bias.
7. The 1960 Peak
The expansion which followed the 1957—58 contraction was the shortest
of the postwar expansions—twenty-five months. GNP in current dollars
increased from its low of $434.7 billion in the first quarter of 1958
to a peak of $504.7 billion during the second quarter of 1960, a rise
of some 15 per cent. In spite of the expansion, the economy never
really approached full employment at any time during the recovery.
The unemployment rate, which had risen above 7.5 per cent during the
recession, never fell below 5 per cent during the upswing.
After August 1958 the FOMC tightened the pressure on reserves of
member banks quickly and vigorously. By the end of the year free
reserves had dropped from about $500 million to a negative $150 mil-
lion. From a 1.75 per cent discount rate in mid-1958, the rate was
moved up steadily until, at the beginning of 1960, it stood at a postwar
high of 4 per cent. With but little variation the FOMC viewed the
economy as expanding throughout 1959, and expected inflation to occur
at almost any moment.
At its first meeting in 1960 the FOMC expressed confidence in the
future outlook. The majority opinion was that "the customary measures
of current activity are almost all up, and further increases seem as cer-
tain for the near term as anything can be."The Committee's con-
sensus was to continue the existing policy and it instructed the account
manager to maintain the status quo.
84Minutes,January 12, 1960, Pp. 6—7. Governor A. L. Mills was consistently
less sanguine than the majority through the first quarter of the year. He dissented
from the optimistic view and argued that:
The opening of the year 1960 reveals the national economy badly over-
extended creditwise and finds the System's Open Market Committee faced with
the necessity of conducting a monetary and credit policy that will prevent tautness
in the credit markets from reaching the breaking point and still allow enough
credit headroom to support stable and sustainable economic growth. The rationale
of such policy argues that deflation is a more imminent danger than inflation,
and that if a severe deflation is to be avoided economic momentum must be main-
tained through the invigorating impulse of a reasonable flow of newly created
commercial bank credit into the economy. (Ibid., pp. 31—32.)Recognition Pattern: Chronological Review 99
By its second meeting in January, sufficient evidence had accumu-
lated to indicate that the expected vigorous boom with accompanying
inflationary pressures had not developed. The failure of the economy
to meet these expectations introduced some uneasiness. While the Com-
mittee still felt that forces were on the side of expansion, some members
expressed tentative doubts about the future level of activity. The con-
sensus of the meeting was that an "even keel" should be maintained
and that no change in the policy directive was called for.
The Committee continued to discount the poor performance of the
economy at the February meeting. Its feeling was that the performance
was bad only in relation to exuberant expectations. The majority opin-
ion was expressed by Guy Noyes and Alfred Hayes. Noyes said, "The
prospects for avoiding an inflationary boom are certainly brighter—
and as is inevitably the case, the possibility that we may be confronted
with a major readjustment is similarly enhanced." 85Hayesalso recog-
nized the moderating tendency but stated, "I believe it would be a
mistake, however, to over-emphasize these moderate tendencies, since
the basic outlook for production, employment, and spending is strong,
and the possibility of an inflationary boom cannot be dismissed com-
pletely while the year is yet so young." 86TheCommittee's decision was
that open market operations should be directed toward a "slight but not
visible" The certainty score assigned was 30 (see Chart 11-7).
At its meetings in March, the Committee expressed increasing concern
about the future course of business activity, primarily because of the
failure of new expansionary forces to appear. Typical statements describ-
ing the situation were:
On balance, the current business lull appears likely to represent a period
of hesitation in a strong or expanding economy, rather than the beginning
of a cumulative downward movement.88
The upward trend of activity seemed definitely to have slowed somewhat,
but there were no signs of serious weakness.89
The country was in the midst of a lull before an outbreak of expansionary
forces in the near future.9°
ibid., February 9,1960, pp. 114—115.
86Ibid., pp.120—122.
87Ibid., p.168.
88 Ibid.,March 22, 1960, pp.267—268.
89ibid., pp.276—277.
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The Committee agreed that its policy in the immediate future should be
one of moderately less restraint and that open market operations should
be conducted with a view "to fostering sustainable growth in economic
activity and employment while guarding against excessive credit ex-
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pansion." 91 The statements cited above indicate that the FOMC was
fully aware of a slowing down in activity but did not anticipate the
beginning of a cyclical contraction.
The April economic outlook was still uncertain, but fears of a cyclical
downturn were not expressed. The statement that most closely character-
ized the Committee's position came from Governor Balderston, who
stated that "the situation at the moment seemed to be one that might
be described as 'rolling prosperity.' Whether it was rolling uphill, on the
level, or downhill, he did not know.•"Themeeting resulted in
a consensus to move in the direction of slightly more ease but with
great care that this not be done in an overt way so that no one would
get the impression that the Committee was more concerned about the
future outlook than it really was. The minutes made it clear that the
Committee was fully cognizant of the deteriorating economic condition
but that it was not convinced that the deflationary forces were cyclical
in nature. The certainty score assigned was 40.
During May, the NBER peak month, the Committee members voted
to move toward zero free reserves—another move in the direction of
ease. They characterized this action as "leaning against the wind" when,
as they viewed the situation, there was no deflationary or inflationary
wind to lean against. A zero level of free reserves was considered to
be a neutral policy which was appropriate to a view that the economy
was undergoing a moderate expansion with no evidence of inflation.
Comments indicative of this view were:
Although economic activity is at a relatively high level and will probably
continue its expanding trend, the expansion is likely to be moderate .
.
Themost recent business information indicates the probability of a
moderate expansion in business activity.94
The chances were greater that the economy would move upward than
it would move downward.°5
This outlook was shared with varying degrees of confidence by most of
the Committee members. The minutes show that the policy change was
not taken in anticipation of a cyclical contraction.
The Committee's outlook was a little less optimistic in June. The
March 1, 1960, pp. 252—253.
Ibid., April 12, 1960, pp. 357—359.
98 Ibid.,May3,1960, pp.389—392.
pp. 394—395.
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typical comment was that "although some of the business data that have
become available during the last three weeks have been disappointing,
they do not alter the prospects of further moderate business expansion
in the second half of the year."In general, the Committee agreed
that the immediate outlook was for little change from the current situa-
tion; the economy was moving sidewise, perhaps with a slight upward
tilt. The consensus of the Committee was to "mark time" until the out-
look was clearer and that errors, if any, should be on the side of ease.
Again it is clear that the FOMC did not yet view a recession as probable,
and the certainty score assigned was 45.
By July there was a decided shift toward pessimism. For the first
time, the Committee viewed the most probable outcome as something
other than modest expansion—either continued sidewise movement or a
downswing. Some sample comments by members indicated the range of
opinion within the Committee. Karl Bopp expressed the view that "on
balance there was less danger of a renewed burst of inflation than of
continuation of the current lull or a turn downward." 9TWatrousIrons
said that the economy was moving along sideways at a high level while
J. A. Erickson felt that the situation could be described as "coasting
uphill." 98GovernorBalderston was less sanguine than the majority and
correctly interpreted the indications of cyclical decline. He was persuaded
that a turn had occurred, and said that "in his view the decline that one
might expect at this phase of the cycle was now evident and should
be countered actively..."The members agreed with Chairman
Martin's statement that "it appeared that the Committee unanimously
wanted to trend toward an easier reserve position. •"100
Evenat their August meeting, a majority of the Committee felt the
economy was still operating on a high plateau. While some members
were more pessimistic than the following statement indicates,itis
characteristic of the majority opinion:
The picture [was] one of fairly level activity with no widely divergent
offsetting trends. There were some divergent trends,it was true, but in
general the economy was moving at a good level.10'
96Ibid.,June 14, 1960, pp. 503—505.
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The directive was changed, with four members objecting, to provide that
open market operations should be conducted with a view "to en-
couraging monetary expansion for the purpose of fostering sustainable
growth in economic activity and employment." 102 Although the direc-
tive was changed, policy was only slightly modified (if at all). The
consensus was stated by Governor Balderston (acting chairman) and
summarized in the minutes:
a continuance of the current policy, giving to the Account Manager more
than the usual freedom to follow the feel of the market because of the
changes in reserve requirements that were to occur in the near future?°3
The four members who objected to the directive change felt "that the
consensus did not contemplate a sufficient modification in the course
and objectives of open market operations to necessitate a change in the
directive." 104
There was a substantial increase in pessimism by September. The
Committee was fully aware that adjustments had been and were taking
place, but seemed to be about evenly divided between thinking that
sufficient grounds had been laid for renewed expansion and believing
that more adjustments and deterioration were still ahead. On balance
the Committee felt that:
The economy has already made a number of important adjustments that
are ordinarily associated with a moderate recession in business activity,
and...withthe benefit of hindsight we may find 1960 was a year of
moderate recession, and that 1961 will be one of recovery.105
The policy decision was to maintain an "even keel" with doubts resolved
on the side of ease. The certainty score of 65 reflects the Committee's
judgment that some downward drift in activity was the most probable
direction of business.
Despite the evidence that had accumulated by October that economic
activity was slowing down, not all members of the Committee were
convinced that the economy was in the midst of a recession. But the
doubters constituted a small minority and even they thought that the
economy was on the verge of a decline. The attitude of the members is
102 Ibid.,p.689.
103Ibid., p. 686.
104 Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1960, p. 63.
Ibid., September 13, 1960, pp. 697—699.104 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
indicated by the following short phrases from their appraisals of the
outlook: "depth and duration of the recession," "there was little evidence
to support anything other than a pessimistic view,""little cheerful
news," "recessionary economic influences," "signs of further weakening,"
and "sliding-off of activity." Perhaps Chairman Martin's statement best
characterizes the Committee's view of the situation:
There was a declining business picture, whether it be called a recession
or a rolling adjustment, but the economy was not going over a precipice by
any means. There was no sign as yet that the decline had burgeoned
into a major depression. There had been recessionary tendencies since
March 106
Itsdiscussion makes it evident that the Committee wished to continue
the easy money policy.
In November, the Committee confirmed the existence of recession.
Guy Noyes, in summarizing the staff report, stated:
For what it is worth, the evidence of future plans suggests that the further
declines will be less precipitous than any other postwar downturn.
Certainly, the downward drift in the economy so far is not the sort of
decline that has generally been associated with a recession in business cycle
analysis.It has led to a profusion of new and refurbished descriptive
phrases—and I can see no harm in offering still another. I would like to
suggest that this might be termed a "moderated recession." 107
TheCommittee agreed with the staff's analysis of the situation and the
policy pursued was continued ease. Thus the "confirmation lag" at the
1960 peak was six months.
For the Committee, certainty scores in the vicinity of the 1960 peak
were the second lowest among all turns. For the average of the eight
business analysts and for the "best" analyst, the performance was the
poorest among all turns, peaks or troughs. Although their recognition
patterns are quite similar, the Committee "recognized" and "confirmed"
the peak well before the other forecasters (see Chart 11-7). Perhaps some
of the FOMC's superiority can be accounted for by quicker access to the
relevant economic data. However, here the Committee simply seems to
have been the best forecaster.
A number of factors account for the relatively poor performances
in recognizing the cyclical nature of the deterioration in business condi-
106 Ibid., October 25, 1960, p.837.
107 Ibid.,November 22, 1960,pp. 859—861.Recognition Pattern: Chronological Review 105
tions. Because of the extreme mildness of the decline in GNP (from
$504.7 billion in 1960-Il to $503.3 billion in 1960-IV), itislittle
wonder that the Committee hesitated to confirm the existence of reces-
sion. Characterizing the situation as "idling in neutral," "sidewise at a
high level," etc., was not wholly inappropriate. An additional factor
working against early "recognition" and "confirmation" may have been
the decision to ease prior to the turn. As early as February, policy was
changed to a "slight but not visible" easing and the degree of ease was
continually increased through the next several months. Consequently
the Committee was not under real pressure to recognize the peak and
reverse the direction of policy.
8. Summary
OVER-ALL PERFORMANCE
A useful way to evaluate the Committee's performance in forecasting
and recognizing cyclical changes in business conditions is to compare its
recognition pattern with that of other forecasters. The recognition pat-
terns of the FOMC and the mean patterns of the eight business analysts
analyzed by Fels are quite similar. At only two turns, the 1949 trough
and the 1960 peak, did the recognition and confirmation lags of the
two groups differ significantly. In the case of the 1949 trough, the re-
cession was double-bottomed and the Committee recognized the first
turn as the true bottom. In 1960, the FOMC seems to have had a
greater appreciation of the deflationary forces at work and, consequently,
made better forecasts than the business publications.
For the most part, the cyclical turns which the Committee and the
business analysts found easy or difficult to recognize were the same
(see Table 11-2). For both groups the troughs of 1949 and 1954 were
the most readily recognized of all turns; the peaks of 1948 and 1960
the most difficult. There is a striking similarity in the rankings of the
average certainty score for each turn between the two groups. This
similarity holds if each turn is ranked among all turns and if the peaks
and troughs are ranked separately.
Both the Committee and the business analysts consistently recognized
and confirmed the occurrence of troughs more promptly than peaks
(see Charts 11-8, 11-9, and 11-10). At the four peaks studied, the FOMC















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































'Recognition Pattern: Chronological Review
CHART 11-8













-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3+4 +5




Part I of this study and other original data made available to the
months; a mean score of 90 or better after a lag of sixmonths.The
eight business analysts, taken as an average, exceeded a mean score
of 50 three months after the peaks; a mean score of 90 was not achieved
even after the lapse of six months (see Chart 11-9). At the three troughs
studied, the FOMC achieved a mean certainty score of 55 with a zero
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Months before (—) or after (+) business cycle peak
SOURCE:Part I of this study and other original data made available
author.
business publications exceeded a mean score of 50 one month
to the troughs; a mean score of 90 or better after
(Chart 11-10).
Taking the seven peaks and troughs together,a procedure that tends
to compensate for any optimistic or pessimistic bias, the FOMC achieved
an average certainty score of 27 per cent three months before the
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lag a five-monthSOURCE: Part I of this study and other original data made available to the
author.
turn, 45 per cent at the turn, 71 per cent three months after the turn,
and 96 per cent six months after the turn. The corresponding average
figures for the eight business publications are nearly the same, namely:
28 per cent, 43 per cent, 63 per cent, and 90 per cent.
What accounts for the systematic difference in the recognition patterns
for peaks and troughs? In the case of the FOMC, a contributing
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factor may have been that, until the Accord in 1951, its hands were
virtually tied when it came to fighting inflation. The minutes indicate
that during 1947—50 the Committee was more concerned with halting
inflation, current and expected, than with insuring growth and full em-
ployment. It was during this period that the FOMC turned in its worst
performance for recognizing a peak and its best performance for recog-
nizing a trough. Its striving to disentangle itself from the responsibility
for supporting government security prices impressed upon the FOMC
the difficulties of combating inflation.
The dominant reason, however, seems to be that postwar peaks were
inherently more difficult to recognize than troughs. In addition, histor-
ically, expansions have been more variable in length than have con-
tractions. Since this is well known and expected by forecasters, they are
continually on the lookout for the end of contractions but not for ex-
pansions.'°8 As Fels suggested, forecasters were continually optimistic
about the depth and duration of postwar recessions:
Despite the forebodings of an occasional prophet of doom, forecasters
have generally expected each contraction to be short and mild. Although
they were not able to pinpoint when the trough would come, they were
basically right.109
This optimism is particularly evident in the recognition pattern of the
"best" forecaster (compare Charts lI-il, 11-12, and 11-13). The FOMC
may also have been optimistically "biased." As Guy Noyes, of the Com-
mittee's staff, suggests, "Perhaps this line of thinking proves only that
Americans are incurable optimists, but there is some historical precedent
for 'sidewise movements' that are fully recognized as 'recessions' only
in retrospect." 110Whateverthe reason(s), there was a systematic dif-
ference in recognition patterns between peaks and troughs.
PERFORMANCE AT PEAKS
The Committee reached a mean certainty score of at least 50 two
months after the NBER dates of the peaks; a mean score of 90 or
better six months afterwards. The business publications exceeded a mean
score of 50 three months after the peaks; a mean score of 90 was not
reached within six months afterwards.
Iam indebted to Phillip Cagan of the National Bureau for this point.
109SeePart I, p. 47.
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Part I of this study and other original data made available to the
If the certainty scores in the vicinity of the four peaks are averaged,
there is little difference between the Committee's performance and that
of the eight publications (see Chart 11-9). Over-all, the Committee
did little if any better than the average of the eight. Despite this similarity
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in mean performances, there were substantial differences at each of the
four peaks (see Charts lI-i, 11-3, 11-5, and 11-7). If the performances
at peaks are reviewed individually, the Committee has generally suc-
ceeded in "recognizing" and "confirming" the turns prior to other fore-
casters (see Table 11-2). However, only in the vicinity of the 1960 peak
was the FOMC's recognition performance unambiguously superior to the
business analysts'.
The forecaster with the highest mean certainty score for all turns
taken together was not substantially better than the average of the eight
together (Chart 11-9). Actually there is little to choose in the over-all
performances at peaks between the Committee and the average of the
eight business analysts. Although the mean recognition pattern of the
publication with the best record of recognizing peaks was quite similar
to that of the FOMC, it succeeded in "recognizing" and "confirming"
the turns one month before the Committee (Chart 11-9).
PERFORMANCE AT TROUGHS
The FOMC's mean recognition performance in the vicinity of the
three troughs is more difficult to evaluate. It achieved a mean score of
over 50 with a zero lag; a mean score of 90 or better after a four-month
lag. The eight business analysts taken together exceeded a mean score
of 50 one month prior to the troughs; a mean score of 90 or better
after a five-month lag. The average degree of certainty achieved by the
eight analysts was substantially higher than the Committee's before the
troughs, about the same from the troughs to about two months after-
wards, and then lower (see Chart 11-10). In essence, the business fore-
casters, on the average, "recognized" troughs prior to the FOMC but
"confirmed" their occurrence after the Committee.
Again, the mean performances hide individual differences between
the two groups in recognizing the three troughs (see Charts 11-2, 11-4,
and 11-6). However, only in the vicinity of the 1949 trough was the
recognition performance of the Committee clearly the better. At the
other troughs, the differences in recognition patterns are similar to those
exhibited by their mean patterns.
In the case of troughs, the "best" forecaster was significantly better
in its over-all performance than both the eight analysts and the FOMC.
Its average recognition lag was —threemonths, its average confirmation
lag, + two months (see Chart 11-10). Indeed, its performance in recog-Recognition Pattern and Policy Decisions 115
nizing troughs was so good that it is doubtful that forecasting ability
accounts for it. The "best" forecaster is the publication with the highest
mean recognition score for peaks and troughs taken together. Since it
was only the fourth best performer at peaks, its performance at troughs
primarily accounts for the high over-all certainty score. In fact, it had
the highest mean certainty score at each of the three troughs." Because
of the difference in its performance at peaks and at troughs, one sus-
pects a strong optimistic bias.
SUMMARY
In summary, both the Committee and the business analysts consist-
ently recognized and confirmed the occurrence of troughs more promptly
than peaks. The over-all recognition patterns of the FOMC and the
other forecasters, taken as a group, are quite similar. At peaks there is
little difference between the recognition patterns of the Committee and
the average of the eight; at troughs, the business forecasters were better
in giving early warning but the Committee was better in confirming
their occurrence. All in all, the Committee's ability to forecast and
recognize postwar cyclical turning points "can only be regarded as
splendid," 112ifone assumes the same is true for other forecasters.
4
The FOMC's Recognition Pattern
and Policy Decisions
The two previous studies of the Federal Reserve Board's ability to
recognize and act on cyclical turns disagreed on conclusions. This was
due to their widely different estimates of the Board's ability to recognize
peaks; their results at troughs were of the same general nature. Both
111Fels,unpublished data.
112Brunnerand Meltzer, The Federal Reserve's Attachment to the Free Reserve
Concept, p. 50.